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Abstract
This paper studies how altruistic preferences are changed by markets and incentives. We conduct a
laboratory experiment in a within-subject design. Subjects are asked to choose health care qualities for
hypothetical patients in monopoly, duopoly, and quadropoly. Prices, costs, and patient benets are experi-
mental incentive parameters. In monopoly, subjects choose quality to tradeo¤ between prots and altruistic
patient benets. In duopoly and quadropoly, we model subjects playing a simultaneous-move game. Each
subject is uncertain about an opponents altruism, and competes for patients by choosing qualities. Bayes-
Nash equilibria describe subjectsquality decisions as functions of altruism. Using a nonparametric method,
we estimate the population altruism distributions from Bayes-Nash equilibrium qualities in di¤erent markets
and incentive congurations. Markets tend to reduce altruism, although duopoly and quadropoly equilibrium
qualities are much higher than those in monopoly. Although markets crowd out altruism, the disciplinary
powers of market competition are stronger. Counterfactuals conrm markets change preferences.
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1 Introduction
Recent economic research has questioned the monolithic power of incentives and markets. Economists now
legitimately question if more competition or high-powered incentives must result in more outputs or worker
e¤orts. A multifaceted approach has been advanced. Economic agentspreferences may include more than
utility from nancial reward and disutility from cost or e¤ort. In fact, economic agents may be fair minded,
altruistic, and socially responsible, but may also be spiteful.
Clearly, social and individual preferences determine behaviors and market outcomes. The usual research
methodology says that given multi-dimensional preferences, economists can write analytical and empirical
models to study incentives and markets. A deeper question, of course, is what determines social preferences.
There, economists often concede that anthropologists, sociologists, psychologists, and neuroscientists may
have identied plausible factors such as climate, cultural-historical events, physiology, and genetics to explain
preferences. But when these factors remain exogenous, the usual methodology remains valid.
In this paper, we assess whether social preferences can be changed by markets and incentives, the key
social institutions that economists study. Our focus is on altruism, market competition, and incentives.
This paper presents experimental evidences that altruistic preferences can be diminished by competition and
altered by incentives. In other words, economic models that analyze market-incentive e¤ects on altruism
must confront the possibility that markets and incentives themselves may change altruism.
Our research proceeds in three steps. First, we use a structural model to decompose behavioral changes
into preference e¤ects and market-incentive e¤ects. This is the key conceptual step. Behavioral outcomes
are interactions between preferences and market-incentive institutions.1 Must altruistic preferences remain
immutable when markets and incentives change? Our structural model allows altruistic preferences to be
inuenced by markets and incentives. Behavioral changes are then results of markets and incentives changing
preferences as well as equilibria.
1A few recent papers have made claims that markets do erode morality or social responsibility, but our view is
simply that the decomposition is the key. The recent papers fall short of this; more details are in the literature review
subsection.
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Second, we use a laboratory experiment in which incentives and market competition are exogenously
varied for subjects. Identifying preference and market-incentive e¤ects by real data is too daunting a task.
A controlled environment o¤ers a better chance. Our experimental framing is health care provision, and
subjects are primed to be altruistic. They choose health care qualities which a¤ect their own payo¤s and
which benet patients through a transfer to a charity for the treatment of ophthalmic patients outside the
laboratory. We also have taken care to isolate subjects, so such confounding factors as fairness, collusion, and
spitefulness could be minimized. Each subject experiences di¤erent markets and incentive congurations.
Our within-subject design is appropriate because we claim that preferences change, not just that preferences
are heterogenous (which could be identied by a between-subject design).
Third, we adapt the nonparametric econometric method by Guerre, Perrigne and Vuong (2000) to esti-
mate preference distributions. We estimate subjectsaltruism distributions separately as subjects experience
di¤erent markets and di¤erent incentive congurations. This is a straightforward way to see if altruism dis-
tributions are di¤erent. The nonparametric method does not restrict us to any prespecied distribution
classes.
We show that subjects become less altruistic when they have to compete against others in a duopoly
or in a quadropoly, compared to when they are monopolists. The ip side is that when subjects become
monopolists, they become more altruistic. Our contribution can be likened to the classic Lucas critique
in policy evaluations. Given preferences, equilibrium outcomes result from market-incentive institutions.
This common view is inadequate: preferences are not given. The structure of an economic model consists
of equilibrium decisions based on economic agentspreferences. When preferences vary systematically with
changes in the market-incentive environment, rather than remaining exogenous, a change in the market-
incentive environment will systematically alter the structure of the economic model.
For the theoretical model, we specify that a subjects preferences are given by a weighted average of
patientsbenets from health care quality, and prots. By choosing a higher quality, the subject reduces
prot, but raises patient benets. A more altruistic subject puts a higher weight on patientsbenets. The
tradeo¤ between benets and prots depend on three experimental parameters: a subjects price (revenue)
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per patient, quality cost, and patient benet.
A subject makes decisions in three markets: monopoly, duopoly, and quadropoly. Under monopoly
a subject chooses the quality for the entire patient population. Under duopoly and quadropoly, subjects
move simultaneously and each subjects market share depends on the entire prole of subjects quality
choices, according to a logistic demand function. A total of 361 subjects participated in experimental
sessions in October 2017 and April 2018 at the University of Cologne. Within each of the three markets, we
systematically vary the incentives using a 2 2 2 factorial design. Price, cost, and patient benet assume
binary values for a total of eight incentive congurations. In total, each subject played 24 games.
Each basic game is one of incomplete information: a players altruism is his own private information, but
each is uncertain about another players altruism. We assume that the uncertainty on altruism is described
by a distribution. It is this distribution that we would estimate, for each market and for each incentive
conguration. The estimation is by means of symmetric Bayes-Nash equilibria.
Nonparametric estimation yield very di¤erent altruism distributions for the 24 games. The striking
pattern is that for each incentive conguration, estimated altruism distributions exhibit lower means in
duopoly relative to monopoly, and yet even lower means in quadropoly. Subjects have become less altruistic
and value prots more when the market becomes more competitive. What is more striking, however, is that
the observed equilibrium qualities are much higher in duopoly and quadropoly than monopoly. Although
subjects have become less altruistic, the competition disciplinary force is stronger.
These results o¤er a deeper interpretation than the usual, reduced-form approach. If only behavioral
results are considered, then markets and incentives are shown to raise qualities, so one would conclude that
there is no crowding out. We reject the simplistic conclusion. In fact, quality changes result from two e¤ects:
preference changes, and market-incentive changes. The e¤ects go in opposite directions. Markets reduce
altruism, but also discipline subjects. In our experiment, the market-incentive e¤ect is stronger than the
preference-change e¤ect. Together they produce the observed behavioral results. Our structural approach
permits counter factual calculations. It also allows straightforward robustness checks.
It has not escaped our notice that the ultimate questions are: why has competition, according to our
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evidence, diminished altruism, and why has the competitive disciplinary e¤ect turned out to be stronger?
These questions, perhaps, strike a counterpoint to the usual exogenous assumptions for analysis of economic
models. Recent advances in neuroscience have adopted a reductionist principle that all behaviors can be
traced to electrochemical activities in the brain. We are neither in any position to render an opinion nor did
we manage to use brain scans to assess if competition triggered specic neural activities. However, we can
speculate. When subjects play monopoly, they only have to consider a tradeo¤ between prots and patient
benets. When subjects play duopoly, they are presented with an additional concern: the competitors
quality choice. The tradeo¤ between prots and patient benets now depends on what the rival subject
would choose. Complexity has increased, and perhaps the higher cognitive demand has diluted the concern
for patient benets.
The plan of the paper is as follows. The next subsection is a literature review. The model is set up in
Section 2. The experimental design and sessions are described in Section 3. In Section 4, we present quality
choice descriptive statistics, the nonparametric estimator, and then estimation results on altruism. We end
the section with some counterfactual quality estimations. Section 5 presents the reduced-form analysis.
The last section draws some conclusion. Appendix A contains experiment materials. Appendix B contains
robustness checks. We consider an alternate utility function, and a between-subject subsample.
1.1 Literature review
Our paper is related to three strands in the literature. First, we relate to the growing body of work on the
impact of markets on moral and prosocial behaviors. Evidence from laboratory experiments in such framing
and contexts as altruistic motives, free-riding, and social responsibility indicates that competition reduces
moral behavior.
Falk and Szech (2013) show that repeated interactions in bilateral and multilateral free-o¤er markets
reduce morals compared to individual decisions. Subjects are more willing to accept a negative externality
imposed on a third-party (a mouse getting killed) in markets. Using a consumer and rms in a laboratory
experiment, Bartling, Weber, and Yao (2014) analyze socially responsible behavior in posted-price markets.
They nd evidence for socially responsible behaviors in market, but such behaviors are stronger in non-
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market contexts. In a follow-up study, Bartling, Valero, and Weber (2017) report similar patterns for
di¤erent externalities. Kirchler et al. (2015) analyze how trading anonymity, involvement with the traded
good, and punishment inuence moral behavior in a double auction with negative externalities imposed on
third parties (voiding measles vaccine donations). Building on Kirchler et al. (2015), Sutter et al. (2016)
report that moral behaviors are consistent with lower trading volume in markets with negative externalities,
but externalities do not a¤ect market prices.
The above studies di¤er from ours in several ways. First, and most important, they study behavioral
changes in individual and market settings. Besides behavioral changes, we investigate preference changes.
Second, we use a structural model to identify changes in preferences and changes in behaviors; by contract
earlier studies have used reduced-form models. Bartling, Weber, and Yao (2014) go beyond a reduced form,
and model consumerspreferences by a linear utility model. Whereas they show that the average buyer cares
for a third-partys earnings, preferences are assumed to remain unchanged in di¤erent treatments.
The above studies use a between-subject design. Instead, we use a within-subject design to identify
preferences change. Also, we examine a (regulated) market in which economic agents on the supply-side
compete for market share by beneting third parties. We do not let subjects do harm to third parties.2
Neither do we let subjects receive feedbacks about their decisions, so learning, reputation, and social norms
are well controlled; for further discussion, see Bartling, Weber and Yao (2014) and Breyer and Weimann
(2015). Furthermore, we change competition and incentives one at a time, so the confounding e¤ects of
multiple changes between manipulations can be avoided.
Our study relates to the literature on prosocial behavior, incentives, and crowding-out. Ultimatum-
dictator game experiments on public good, trust, and gift-exchange analyze behavioral changes due to
incentives; see Bowles and Polania-Reyes (2012) for a summary. Economic incentives are often found to
reduce pro-social behaviors. Experimental evidence tends to conrm crowding out; see, for example, Falk and
Kosfeld (2006), Gneezy and Rustichini (2000a, b), and Mellström and Johannesson (2008). Our paper points
2A prominent example in which social preferences are an important concern for supply sides behavior is markets
for public services (e.g., Besley and Ghatak, 2005) and credence goods (e.g., Dulleck and Kerschbamer, 2006; Dulleck,
Kerschbamer, and Sutter, 2011), and health care (e.g., Arrow, 1963).
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to the inadequacy of identifying only crowding out in terms of outcomes. Incentive schemes are disciplinary,
even when they may erode social motives. The missing link is that market-incentive mechanisms and social
motives pull in di¤erent directions, and it is an empirical matter which is stronger.
Finally, our nonparametric estimation relates to the literature on structurally estimating preferences.
This literature has been on measuring inequity aversion and reciprocity (e.g., Charness and Rabin, 2002;
Bellemare, Kröger, and van Soest, 2008), and altruism (e.g., Andreoni, 1989; Andreoni and Miller, 2002;
Fisman, Kariv, and Markovits, 2007); see DellaVigna (2018) for a summary. Using data from eld experi-
ments, a few papers structurally infer social preferences to identify di¤erences between charitable giving and
worker e¤ort; see DellaVigna, List, and Malmendier (2012) and DellaVigna et al. (2016). We, however, use
a nonparametric estimator developed by Guerre, Perrigne and Vuong (2000) that has originated from esti-
mating Bayes-Nash equilibria in rst-price auctions. We have used the monotonicity of qualities in altruism
for identication; this is similar to identication by the monotonicity of auction bids in valuations in Guerre,
Perrigne and Vuong (2000).
2 A model of altruism and competition
The experiment frames subjects to provide medical services at some quality to a set of patients.3 We study
three market games: monopoly, duopoly, and quadropoly. The monopoly game is a single-person decision
problem, and the simultaneous-move duopoly and quadropoly games are strategic problems.
2.1 Demand
In each market, there are 100 patients. Under monopoly, each subject simply makes the quality decision,
q between 0 and 10, for all the 100 patients. In duopoly and quadropoly, subjects choose qualities simul-
taneously. Then the subjectsquality prole determines each subjects market share according to a logistic
demand system. For duopoly, let q1 and q2 be qualities chosen by subject 1 and subject 2. The numbers of
3There were no real patients in the laboratory, and the subjects were not medical doctors. We operationalized
the quality of medical services by converting it to actual cash payments that beneted real patients outside of the
laboratory. See footnote 4 and the end of Subsection 3.1.
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patients for subjects 1 and 2 are, respectively,
100 exp(bq1)
exp(bq1) + exp(bq2)
and
100 exp(bq2)
exp(bq1) + exp(bq2)
, (1)
where b > 0 is a patient-benet parameter. For quadropoly, let q1, q2, q3, and q4 denote the four subjects
quality choices. Subject i who chooses quality qi will have
100 exp(bqi)
exp(bq1) + exp(bq2) + exp(bq3) + exp(bq4)
(2)
patients. The logistic demand guarantees that each subject gets some patients under any quality prole, and
is commonly used for discrete-choice situations when consumersutilities may be subject to Type I Extreme
Value disturbances.
2.2 Quality choices and preferences
A subject receives a xed payment p > 0 for each patient that he treats. For the theoretical model, a
subjects quality choice is a continuous variable between 0 and 10 (although in the experiment we set the
possible qualities to be integers between 0 and 10, a total of 11 choices). The subject bears the per-patient
quality cost at cq2 when he provides medical service at quality q, where c > 0 is a cost parameter. Medical
service at quality q gives a benet bq to a patient. We call the environment dened by the three parameters,
payment p, cost c, and patient benet b, an incentive conguration.
Our health care framing primes an experiment subject for an altruistic motive when qualities are chosen.
We assume that a subjects preferences are represented by bq + U(p  cq2), for some parameter  and an
increasing and concave function U , so preferences are linear combinations of the patient benet bq, and the
utility of his own prot U(p  cq2). We maintain the assumption that a subject earns altruistic utility from
his own patients. (We will discuss global altruism, in which a subject values all patient benets, in the
next Subsection.) Framing and priming a¤ect subjects di¤erently, so we assume that the preference weight
on patient benet, , is a random variable on an interval [; ]  R with some distribution.
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2.3 Monopoly, duopoly and quadropoly
In monopoly, each subject simply chooses a quality for his 100 patients. If a subjects altruism parameter is
 and he chooses quality q, the subjects per-patient payo¤ is bq+U(p  cq2). A prot-maximizing subject
(whose  is set at 0) chooses q = 0, whereas a subject who only cares about patient benet chooses the
maximum quality, which is 10. Otherwise, a subjects interioroptimal quality is given by the rst-order
condition:
b  U 0(p  cq2) 2cq = 0: (3)
In monopoly, altruism is the only reason behind a subject choosing a strictly positive quality. In fact, the
rst-order condition (3) denes a monotone relationship between  and the optimal quality:
 =
2cq
b
U 0(p  cq2): (4)
A more altruistic subject is willing to forgo more prot for a higher quality for patients. Given a utility
function U , equation (4) allows us to infer the value of  from subjectsquality choices.
The experiment subjects also play the duopoly and quadropoly games. We will lay out all the details
in duopoly, but will be rather succinct in quadropoly. In duopoly, two subjects are randomly paired. They
simultaneously choose qualities, say q1 and q2, which result in market shares in (1). The subjectspayo¤s
are
[1bq1 + U(p  cq21)]
100 exp(bq1)
exp(bq1) + exp(bq2)
and [2bq2 + U(p  cq22)]
100 exp(bq2)
exp(bq1) + exp(bq2)
;
where 1 and 2 are the subjectsaltruism parameters.
We model duopoly as a Bayesian game. We assume that each subjectaltruism parameter, , is drawn
independently from a random variable with distribution F and density f on support [; ]. Each subject
observes his own altruism parameter, but not an opponents altruism parameter. The uncertainty on the
altruism parameter  is the basis for the Bayesian perspective, and stems from framing having di¤erent
e¤ects on di¤erent subjects.
A subjects strategy in the duopoly game is a function that maps the altruism parameter  to a quality,
say, q : [; ] ! [0; 10]. If subject 1 has altruism parameter 1 and chooses q1 when the rival subject 2
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follows a strategy q0 : [; ]! [0; 10], subject 1s expected utility is
EU(q1; q
0) =
Z 


[1bq1 + U(p  cq21)]

100 exp(bq1)
exp(bq1) + exp(bq0(x))

dF (x)
= [1bq1 + U(p  cq21)]
Z 


100 exp(bq1)
exp(bq1) + exp(bq0(x))

dF (x): (5)
We assume that a subject does not earn any utility from patient benets provided by a rival subject. The
expression in (5) only concerns those patients the subject serves. An alternate form of global altruism,
which includes patient benets the rival subject provides is outside our current consideration. A rst reason
is tractability; Bayes-Nash equilibria will be more complicated, and the estimation of the equilibria would
become di¢ cult. Second, global altruism will inevitably involve some concern about free riding, and some
notion about social norm of quality provision, which we have chosen to suppress. The suppression of concern
other than private altruism will be discussed in the experimental design section.
The market share is dened by
S(q1; q
0)  exp(bq1)
exp(bq1) + exp(bq0)
;
so we can rewrite the expected utility in (5) as
EU(q1; q
0) = [1bq1 + U(p  cq21)]
Z 

100S(q1; q
0(x))dF (x): (6)
The market share term is the di¤erence between monopoly and duopoly. A subject choosing a higher quality
earns a higher market share:
dS(q1; q0)
dq1
= bS(q1; q
0)[1  S(q1; q0)] > 0
In duopoly, even a purely prot-maximizing subject ( = 0) has an incentive to o¤er quality because a higher
quality gains market share which generates prots.
For each value of 1 2 [; ], we let
q(1; q
0) = argmax
q1
[1bq1 + U(p  cq21)]
Z 

100S(q1; q
0(x))dF (x) (7)
be subject 1s best response against the rivals strategy q0() : [; ] ! [0; 10]. A subjects optimal quality
choice is still a tradeo¤ between prot and patient benet. However, a subjects payo¤ depends on what
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he believes about his rival subjects qualities, which are chosen according to the strategy q0. A symmetric
Bayes-Nash equilibrium strategy species a subjects quality choice for each value of the altruism parameter
that maximizes the subjects expected utility, given that the rival subject uses the same strategy.
Denition 1 (Duopoly Bayes-Nash Equilibrium) The strategy q : [; ] ! [0; 10] is a symmetric
Bayes-Nash equilibrium, if, at each  2 [; ],
q() = argmax
q
[bq + U(p  cq2)]
Z 

100S(q; q(x))dF (x): (8)
The usual characterization of an equilibrium is by means of the rst-order condition for the maximization
of (6) or the best response in (7). Given a rivals strategy q0, for the maximization of expected utility in (6),
we obtain the rst-order derivative with respect to q1:
@ EU(q1; q
0)
@q1
= [1b  2cq1U 0(p  cq21)]
Z 

100S(q1; q
0(x))dF (x)
+ [1bq1 + U(p  cq21)]
Z 

100bS(q1; q
0(x))[1  S(q1; q0(x))]dF (x): (9)
We assume that the expected utility in (6) is quasi-concave for the incentive congurations under consider-
ation. Hence, by setting the rst-order derivative to zero, we obtain the implicit function that denes the
best response at .
To characterize the symmetric Bayes-Nash equilibrium q : [; ] ! [0; 10], we note that at the equilib-
rium, each subject has the same rst-order condition. The equilibrium q therefore is dened by the equation
from setting (9) to 0 at each  2 [; ] with q0 set to q:
[b  2cq()U 0(p  cq()2)]
Z 

100S(q(); q(x))dF (x) (10)
+[bq() + U(p  cq()2)]
Z 

100bS(q(); q(x))[1  S(q(); q(x))]dF (x) = 0:
Being the solution of an integral equation, a symmetric Bayes-Nash equilibrium is di¢ cult to compute, even
for simple functional forms of the utility U and distribution F . Fortunately, we do not have to rely on this
computation. In fact, what makes our model operational is the following.
Lemma 1 Equilibrium strategy q : [; ]! [0; 10] is monotone increasing in .
10
Proof of Lemma 1: Using the rst-order derivative of EU with respect to q1 in (9), we further di¤er-
entiate this with respect to 1 to obtain
@2 EU(q1; q
0)
@1@q1
= b
Z 

100S(q1; q
0(x))dF (x) + bq1
Z 

100bS(q1; q
0(x))[1  S(q1; q0(x))]dF (x) > 0:
By assumption EU is quasi-concave in q1, so as 1 increases, the optimal quality increases. This is true for
any given strategy q0, so remains valid at the equilibrium q.
Because  is a random variable, the equilibrium strategy q() is also a random variable. An equilibrium
duopoly is the pair of qualities specied by the equilibrium strategy, (q(1); q(2)), for two independent
realizations of , namely 1 for the rst subject, and 2 for the second subject.
Remark 1 (Duopoly Equilibrium Quality Distribution) The Bayes-Nash equilibrium q induces a
joint distribution of the two subjectsequilibrium qualities on [0; 10][0; 10]. By symmetry and independence,
the marginal density is the one induced by the equilibrium strategy q. Denoting this marginal distribution
by G : [0; 10]! [0; 1], we conclude that for eq 2 [0; 10], G(eq) = F (e), where q(e) = eq.
The actual play of the duopoly are realizations of G. By the monotonicity of the equilibrium q, the
distribution F of  and the equilibrium quality distribution G are isomorphic. Whereas we have no data
on F , we do have data on qualities from equilibrium play. This is the key to the estimation of the altruism
distribution F under duopoly, and Subsection 4.2 will present the estimation of G by the empirical quality
distribution.
Next, we discuss quadropoly. There are now four subjects, and the demands are in (2). Otherwise,
there is not much conceptual di¤erence between duopoly and quadropoly. The denition of a symmetric
Bayes-Nash equilibrium has exactly the same form. If subject i chooses quality qi, his market share now is
S(qi; q i) =
exp(bqi)X4
j=1
exp(bqj)
;
where we use q i to denote the quality vector (q1; q2; q3; q4) with the ith element omitted. Given strategies
qj , j = 1; 2; 3; 4, j 6= i, if subject i chooses quality qi his expected utility is

ibqi + U(p  cq2i )
 Z Z Z 100S(qi; q i( i)) 4Y
j=1; j 6=i
dK(j);
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where the notation q i( i) is a short hand for (qj(j); j = 1; 2; 3; 4; j 6= i), and K is the distribution of 
in quadropoly.
Denition 2 (Quadropoly Bayes-Nash Equilibrium) The strategy q() is a symmetric Bayes-Nash
equilibrium, if, at each  2 [; ],
q() = argmax
q

bq + U(p  cq2) Z Z Z 100S(q; q i( i))	 4Y
j=1; j 6=i
dK(j): (11)
We can use the rst-order condition to characterize the equilibrium strategy q. It is straightforward to
verify the same monotonicity property.
Lemma 2 Equilibrium strategy q : [; ]! [0; 10] is monotone increasing in .
Remark 2 (Quadropoly Equilibrium Quality Distribution) The Bayes-Nash equilibrium q induces
a joint distribution of the four subjectsequilibrium qualities on [0; 10]4. By symmetry and independence, the
marginal density is the one induced by the equilibrium strategy q. We denote this marginal distribution by
L : [0; 10]! [0; 1].
Notice that we have used the notation F to denote the altruism distribution in duopoly, but we have
used a di¤erent notation K for that in quadropoly. Although we have the same set of subjects in 3 markets
and 8 incentive congurations, we do allow altruism distributions to vary according to markets and incentive
congurations. We now turn to the experiment.
3 The experiment
3.1 Design
The experimental design implements the theoretical model just described. Role playing as physicians, sub-
jects decide on the quality of health care for a set of hypothetical patients.4 Each subject chooses a medical-
4Hypothetical patient proles, characterizing patients through di¤erent benets from medical treatment decisions,
have been employed in several behavioral experiments in health with medical and non-medcial students (e.g., Hennig-
Schmidt, Selten, Wiesen, 2011; Kesternich, Schumacher, Winter, 2015; and Brosig-Koch et al., 2017) and practicing
physicians (e.g., Brosig-Koch et al., 2016, 2019).
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service quality q from a nite set f0; 1; 2; : : : ; 10g.5 Three parameters determine payo¤s. These are the
capitation payment to the physician p, the quality cost parameter c, and the patient benet parameter, b.
The subject bears the quality cost, so if he chooses a quality q, his prot becomes p   cq2, whereas the
patient benet is bq, exactly the same as in the theoretical model.
We use a 222 factorial design to vary each of the p, c, and b parameters systematically. The capitation
payment p may be low or high, set at 10 and 15, respectively. The cost parameter c can be either 0:075
or 0:1, whereas the benet parameter b can be either 0:5 or 1. All monetary amounts were in terms of the
experimental currency, Taler, which was later converted to Euro at the rate of 100:1. A full set of parameters
can be found in Table 10 in Appendix A. We call a game with a prole of price-cost-benet parameters an
incentive conguration. The 2  2  2 variations set up a total of 8 incentive congurations. There are
3 markets: monopoly, duopoly, and quadropoly. Each subject plays 24 games in the entire experiment: 8
incentive congurations by 3 markets.
The experiment uses a within-subject design. Subjects experience di¤erent markets and incentive con-
gurations, and we aim to investigate how subjects quality choices and preferences change according to
their experiences. In the actual implementation, subjects played all 8 incentive-conguration games in one
market, and then moved onto the next market. Subjects were not informed of the market up until they were
to play the 8 incentive-conguration games in that market.6
There are 6 di¤erent ways to order the three markets, displayed in Table 1. For example, in 3 (D-Q-M)
a subject plays the duopoly game rst, followed by quadropoly, and nally monopoly. We roughly assigned
about 1=6 of the subject population to each of the 6 orders. The last column in Table 1 lists the number of
subjects who participated in each order. We randomize the order in which the 8 incentive congurations are
presented to subjects. In each market, each subject plays the 8 games in the following order: 1st, (p = 10,
c = 0:1, b = 1); 2nd, (p = 10, c = 0:075, b = 1); 3rd, (p = 15, c = 0:1, b = 0:5); 4th, (p = 15, c = 0:1, b = 1);
5This is the only di¤erence from the continuous quality choice assumption in the theoretical model.
6 It was impractical to get subjects to play the 24 games in a random order. Too much back-and-forth between
markets and incentive congurations could be confusing to subjects. Random rematching for 16 times for each subject
also would be too time consuming.
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5th, (p = 10, c = 0:1, b = 0:5); 6th, (p = 10, c = 0:075, b = 0:5); 7th (p = 15, c = 0:075, b = 1) and 8th,
(p = 15, c = 0:075, b = 0:5).
Table 1: Market orders in the experiment
Number
Condition Order of markets of subjects
1 (M-D-Q) Monopoly-Duopoly-Quadropoly 64
2 (M-Q-D) Monopoly-Quadropoly-Duopoly 60
3 (D-Q-M) Duopoly-Quadropoly-Monopoly 63
4 (Q-M-D) Quadropoly-Monopoly-Duopoly 60
5 (Q-D-M) Quadropoly-Duopoly-Monopoly 58
6 (D-M-Q) Duopoly-Monopoly-Quadropoly 56
Total 361
A subject never learns others decisions for any of the 8 incentive-conguration games in a market.
However, at the end of one market session, each subject is given a summary information of actual demands,
prots, and patient benets, aggregated over the 8 games. In duopoly and quadropoly, subjects are randomly
paired or grouped. When subjects are done with one market, say duopoly, the match will be dissolved. Then
subjects will be randomly matched for the next market, say quadropoly. Subjects do play a normal form
game against others randomly drawn from a population.
Our design rules out repeated plays, learning, and reputation. We have thought about the design tradeo¤.
On the one hand, we would like to keep altruism as the main frame, and would like to avoid issues about
norms and collusions. On the other hand, we would have to face the possibility that subjects having to learn
to play a Bayes-Nash equilibrium. In the end, we have come down with a design that would rely on subjects
playing a Bayes-Nash equilibrium with preferences governed by altruism. This explains our suppressing
information of subjectsplay and outcomes. Our approach also gives supports about the rejection of global
altruism. Subjects do not have information about patient benets other than those patients he has chosen
benets for. We have maintained the altruism frame throughout. It is inappropriate to introduce a control
that eliminates the patient benets, or to make the benets independent of subjectsquality choices.
We do want to nd out if subjectspreferences change according to markets and incentive congurations.
Randomly assigning subjects to play di¤erent market and incentive-conguration games would identify dif-
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ferences, not changes. However, we can use a subsample for a between-subject design. We construct this
subsample by taking data from a subjects experiences in the market he or she rst participates. Given that
we have 361 subjects, a between-subject design would put only about 120 subjects in one market, and each
subject would then play only 8 games. The between-subject subsample serves as a comparison with the main
within-subject design. The analysis is in Appendix B. Broadly, the results are consistent with the complete
sample for the within-subject design.
Although there are no real patients, the health benets accrued in the laboratory are converted into
monetary transfers to a charity dedicated to providing surgeries for ophthalmic patients. The patient benet
is thus made salient. A subjects consideration of patients benet from costly quality choices have real
empirical and health-related consequences.
3.2 Experimental sessions
Experimental sessions were carried out in October 2017 and in April 2018, at the Cologne Laboratory for
Experimental Research of the University of Cologne. Subjects in the experiment were mostly students from
the University of Cologne, Germany. Participants were invited via the ORSEE platform (Greiner, 2015).
In total, 361 subjects participated in the experiment.7 Subjects had an average age of about 24 years, and
55% of them were female. Among the subjects who were students, 131 were in law and social sciences, 22 in
medicine, 42 in arts and humanities, 49 in mathematics and natural sciences, 35 in theology. There were 21
in other disciplines or non-students; 61 subjects did not provide their faculty information.
The experiment was programmed in zTree (Fischbacher, 2007). Upon arrival, subjects were randomly
assigned to cubicles. Initial instructions informed subjects that the experiment consisted of three parts.
Detailed instructions of each part would only be given at the start of that part. Each part corresponded to
one of the three markets (monopoly, duopoly, and quadropoly). Participants had adequate time to read the
instructions. The instructions can be found in Appendix A.1. Participants were allowed to ask clarifying
7We dropped three subjects who did not complete their last, monopoly sessions due to technical problems (one
subject in condition 3 (D-Q-M), and two in condition 5 (Q-D-M)). However, these three subjects did interact with
other subjects before they played their last monopoly session. We have kept data of others who played against these
three subjects in duopoly and quadropoly.
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questions, which were answered in private. For each market, subjects needed to answer several control
questions. Subjects should understand the price, cost, and benet parameters, and how quality choices
might a¤ect demands. Each subject must answer all control questions correctly to ensure an adequate
understanding before the start of each part of the experiment. The control questions can be found in
Appendix A.2.
When making a decision, each subject was informed of the incentive-conguration parameters, as well as
prots and the patient benets as functions of the quality that can be one in f0; 1; 2:::; 10g. In monopoly, each
subject had 100 patients. In duopoly and quadropoly, a subject had a logistic demand which depended on
the quality prole of matched subjects. The zTree program provided a calculator, which allowed subjects to
practice inputting own and other playersqualities to calculate the resultant demands (number of patients),
prots, and patient benets for all players. A screen shot of the calculator is in Appendix A.3. After
subjects played the 8 incentive-conguration games in a market, they were informed of their and their paired
subjects or subjectstotal demands (number of patients), and total patient benets in the 8 games. Data
about individual games in each incentive conguration were not given. Our design gets each of 361 subjects
to play 24 games. We have taken steps to guard against experimenter demand e¤ects(see, for example,
Charness, Gneezy and Kuhn, 2012) by not telling subjects all three markets in advance.
We used the common random-choicepayment method to determine prots and patient benets. One of
the 8 incentive-conguration games in each market would be chosen randomly for determining the subjects
prot and the patient benets. The random-choice payment method was implemented for each subject
independently. The method is intended to rule out potential income e¤ects or averagingbehaviors.
One subject was randomly chosen to be a monitor. After the experiment, the monitor veried that a
money order equal to the total patient benet was issued by the Finance Department of the University
of Cologne. The money order was payable to an organization, Christo¤el Blindenmission, which supports
ophthalmologists performing cataract surgeries in a hospital in Masvingo, Zimbabwe. The money order
was sealed in an envelope, and the monitor and an experiment assistant then deposited the envelope in
the nearest mailbox. The monitor was paid an additional e5. Subjects were told in advance that the
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experimental patient benets would be for real patients, but not for those in a developing country. A similar
procedure for making patient benets meaningful to subjects has been applied by, for example, Hennig-
Schmidt, Selten and Wiesen (2011), Kesternich, Schumacher and Winter (2015), and Brosig-Koch et al.
(2017).
Sessions lasted, on average, for about 90 minutes, and subjects earned, on average, about e14.20 (e18.20
including show-up fee). The average benet per patient was about e8.10. In total, e2,923.60 were transferred
to the Christo¤el Blindenmission. Average costs for a cataract operation for adults are about e30, so our
experiment supported about 100 surgeries.8
4 Estimation of altruism distributions from experimental data
We rst present data of subjects quality choices. Then we describe how we estimate structurally the 
altruism distribution for each market and in each incentive conguration.
4.1 Descriptive statistics on subjectsquality choices
Table 2 presents some summary statistics of the 361 subjectsquality choices in the 8 incentive-conguration
games in the 3markets. Clearly, subjects chose higher qualities in duopoly and quadropoly than in monopoly,
and the standard deviations of subjectsquality choices were also much smaller. Raising the intensity of
competition from duopoly to quadropoly increases qualities only slightly more. Within a market, quality
variations between the 8 incentive-conguration games seem quite modest.
8For more on activities of the Christo¤el Blindenmission related to cataract, see
www.cbm.de/spendenCBM_Spenden_Sie_fuer_Operationen_am_Grauen_Star-494570.html.
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Table 2: Means and standard deviations of subjectsquality choices
Incentive congurations Monopoly Duopoly Quadropoly
mean st. dev. mean st. dev. mean st. dev.
(p = 10, c = 0:075, b = 0:5) 4.17 2.99 7.75 1.58 8.26 1.40
(p = 10, c = 0:075, b = 1) 4.15 2.99 7.98 1.59 8.31 1.56
(p = 10, c = 0:1, b = 0:5) 3.79 2.79 6.94 1.35 7.34 1.34
(p = 10, c = 0:1, b = 1) 3.73 2.80 7.09 1.52 7.46 1.34
(p = 15, c = 0:075, b = 0:5) 4.82 3.43 8.82 1.53 9.09 1.32
(p = 15, c = 0:075, b = 1) 4.83 3.41 8.98 1.60 9.15 1.43
(p = 15, c = 0:1, b = 0:5) 4.51 3.27 8.19 1.63 8.55 1.47
(p = 15, c = 0:1, b = 1) 4.44 3.19 8.40 1.62 8.65 1.61
Total 4.31 3.14 8.02 1.70 8.35 1.57
For each of the 24 games, we draw the quality histograms; they are in Figures 1 to 3, and the actual
frequency of each quality between 0 and 10 is written at the top of each vertical bar. These frequencies will
be used for estimating subjectsaltruism parameter.
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Figure 1: Quality histograms in monopoly
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Figure 2: Quality histograms in duopoly
20
Figure 3: Quality histograms in quadropoly
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Clearly, the 24 histograms show higher qualities in duopoly and quadropoly than monopoly. Nevertheless,
the di¤erence between duopoly and quadropoly does not appear to be very signicant. Quality frequencies
are needed for the estimation of altruism parameters, to which we now turn.
4.2 Nonparametric estimation of altruism distribution by Bayes-Nash equilibria
We adapt a nonparametric estimation method developed by Guerre, Perrigne and Vuong (2000) (abbreviated
to GPV) for rst-price auctions. We use duopoly to illustrate the adaptation. First, from the equilibrium
strategy q in (10), we invert and obtain  in terms of the equilibrium quality q(), the utility function U ,
and incentive parameters:
 =
8>>><>>>:
2cq()U 0(p  cq()2)
Z 

S(q(); q(x))dF (x)
 U(p  cq()2)
Z 

bS(q(); q(x))[1  S(q(); q(x))]dF (x)
9>>>=>>>;8>>><>>>:
b
Z 

S(q(); q(x))dF (x)
+bq()
Z 

bS(q(); q(x))[1  S(q(); q(x))]dF (x)
9>>>=>>>;
: (12)
Given an equilibrium q, the uncertainty concerning a rival subjects altruism is equivalent to the uncertainty
of the rivals quality choices. From Remark 1, we can replace the altruism distribution F by the equilibrium
quality distribution G. Then, using q to denote the equilibrium quality chosen by the subject with altruism
parameter , we rewrite (12) as
 =
2cqU 0(p  cq2)
Z 10
0
S(q;x)dG(x)  U(p  cq2)
Z 10
0
bS(q;x)[1  S(q;x)]dG(x)
b
Z 10
0
S(q;x)dG(x) + bq
Z 10
0
bS(q;x)[1  S(q;x)]dG(x)
: (13)
This says that given an equilibrium q, we can use the equilibrium quality distribution G to express a
subjects altruism parameter  in terms of his quality choice q. We estimate the  distribution by recovering
their values from subjectsquality choices. The estimated  is a nonlinear map of the chosen quality q, and
the equilibrium quality distribution G, given the games parameters.
The argument suggests that we adapt the GPV two-step method as follows. In Step 1, the densities of
equilibrium quality distribution G are estimated by the empirical quality densities in each market-incentive-
conguration constellation. Let bg(x) denote the empirical quality densities; it is the fraction of subjects (out
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of the total of 361) who have chosen quality x = 0; 1; :::; 10. We use bg(x) to estimate the Gs densities. The
empirical densities of the 24 games are those in Figures 1 to 3.
The term
Z 10
0
S(q;x)dG(x) in (13) is now estimated by
10X
x=0
S(q;x)bg(x); similarly, the term Z 10
0
bS(q;x)[1 
S(q;x)]dG(x) in (13) is estimated by
10X
x=0
bS(q;x)[1   S(q;x)]bg(x). For each subject i = 1; :::; 361, we use
(13) to calculate:
^i =
2cqiU
0(p  cq2i )
10P
x=0
S(qi;x)bg(x)  U(p  cq2i ) 10P
x=0
bS(qi;x)[1  S(qi;x)]bg(x)
b
10P
x=0
S(qi;x)bg(x) + bqi 10P
x=0
bS(qi;x)[1  S(qi;x)]bg(x) ; (14)
which is an estimate of subject is . In Step 2, we use the sample of estimated s to estimate nonpara-
metrically the altruism distribution:
bF (a) = 1
361
361X
i=1
If^i  ag: (15)
where I is the indicator function that takes the value 1 when the condition inside the curly brackets is
satised, and 0 otherwise.
The estimation procedures are similar for monopoly and quadropoly. In monopoly, we use the rst-
order condition (4) to recover a subjects  value from his quality choice in any given incentive-market
conguration. In other words, in the rst step, for each i = 1; :::; 361, we compute
^i =
2cqiU
0(p  cq2i )
b
:
Then these estimated s are used to estimate the distribution of altruism in the second step.
For quadropoly, in the rst step, we compute the following
^i =
2cqiU
0(p  cq2i )
10P
x;y;z=0
S(qi;x; y; z)bl(x)bl(y)bl(z)  U(p  cq2i ) 10P
x;y;z=0
bS(qi;x; y; z)[1  S(qi;x; y; z)]bl(x)bl(y)bl(z)
b
10P
x;y;z=0
S(qi;x; y; z)bl(x)bl(y)bl(z) + bqi 10P
x;y;z=0
bS(qi;x; y; z)[1  S(qi;x; y; z)]bl(x)bl(y)bl(z) ;
where bl(x); x = 0; 1; :::; 10 is the empirical density function of quality in quadropoly. In the second step,
these estimated s are used to estimate the altruism distribution K.
Given preferences and a symmetric equilibrium, our Bayesian game with independent values is identied
by the equilibrium quality being monotone in altruism. The basic games and identication are the same as
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in GPV, whose two-step estimator for biddersvaluation distribution in rst-price auctions is consistent and
asymptotically e¢ cient. These results depend on the assumption that the unknown valuation distribution
is smooth. However, subjects in our game choose from only 11 possible qualities. We therefore can only
estimate the unknown altruism distribution by histograms with 11 possible values. Even with more subjects,
we would be unable to approximate a smooth distribution by histograms with a limited number of values.
4.3 Estimates of altruism distributions
We assume that the utility function U is linear: U(x) = x. In this case,  is the marginal rate of substitution
between patient benet bq and prot p  cq2. Our main results will be based on this structural assumption.
When U is linear, for monopoly we have
 =
2cq
b
; (16)
for duopoly, we have
 =
2cq
Z 10
0
S(q;x)dG(x)  (p  cq2)
Z 10
0
bS(q;x)[1  S(q;x)]dG(x)
b
Z 10
0
S(q;x)dG(x) + bq
Z 10
0
bS(q;x)[1  S(q;x)]dG(x)
: (17)
For brevity, we do not write down the corresponding expression for  under quadropoly.
We have also used the alternate assumption of the utility function exhibiting a constant coe¢ cient of
absolute risk aversion.9 The estimation results for U(x)  1   exp( rx) are in Appendix B. There we set
the coe¢ cient of absolute risk aversion r at 0:10. (We have also obtained results for r set at 0:05 and 0:15.
Results turn out to be similar and are available from the authors.) The drawback is that the marginal rate
of substitution between patient benet and prot varies with the quality level, so the estimated value of 
is not so easy to interpret.
We rst present summary statistics of the estimated altruism distributions. Table 3 lists the means of
the estimated  distributions in monopoly. We use these estimated monopoly means as normalization. In
9CARA is a common functional form for risk preferences in the literature. See, for example, Barseghyan et al.,
2018. It has been used for estimating risk preferences from individual-level data in contexts such as property insurance
(Cohen and Einav, 2007; Barseghyan et al., 2016), game shows (Beetsma and Schotman, 2001; Andersen et al., 2008),
and health insurance (Einav et al., 2013; Handel and Kolstad, 2015). In experiments, the CARA specication also
has been used for estimating risk preferences (Harrison and Rutström, 2008).
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Table 3: Estimated means of  in monopoly
Incentive congurations mean
(p = 10, c = 0:075, b = 0:5) 1.252
(p = 10, c = 0:075, b = 1) 0.622
(p = 10, c = 0:1, b = 0:5) 1.515
(p = 10, c = 0:1, b = 1) 0.746
(p = 15, c = 0:075, b = 0:5) 1.446
(p = 15, c = 0:075, b = 1) 0.725
(p = 15, c = 0:1, b = 0:5) 1.805
(p = 15, c = 0:1, b = 1) 0.889
duopoly and quadropoly, for each incentive conguration, we subtract the estimated monopoly mean from
each estimated . This normalization uses the estimated monopoly mean as the origin. In Table 4, we present
the normalized means and standard deviations of the 24 altruism distributions. Due to the normalization,
each reported monopoly  distribution in Table 4 has a zero mean. Across a row in Table 4, for example,
the magnitude  1:335 for the duopoly  mean in incentive conguration (p = 10, c = 0:075, b = 0:5) says
that when the market changes from monopoly to duopoly, the average altruism parameter has decreased by
1:335.
Table 4: Normalized means and standard deviations of  distributions
Incentive congurations Monopoly Duopoly Quadropoly
mean st. dev. mean st. dev. mean st. dev.
(p = 10, c = 0:075, b = 0:5) 0 0.898 -1.335 0.939 -1.579 0.766
(p = 10, c = 0:075, b = 1) 0 0.448 -0.812 0.612 -0.985 0.657
(p = 10, c = 0:1, b = 0:5) 0 1.117 -1.378 0.903 -2.233 1.710
(p = 10, c = 0:1, b = 1) 0 0.559 -0.882 0.725 -1.069 0.822
(p = 15, c = 0:075, b = 0:5) 0 1.028 -1.980 0.928 -2.382 0.980
(p = 15, c = 0:075, b = 1) 0 0.512 -1.244 0.767 -1.471 1.138
(p = 15, c = 0:1, b = 0:5) 0 1.308 -2.001 1.327 -2.428 1.147
(p = 15, c = 0:1, b = 1) 0 0.638 -1.207 0.827 -1.485 1.016
The striking observation is that across each row, the average altruism has decreased from monopoly
to duopoly, and then decreased further more from duopoly to quadropoly! This is clear evidence that
competition reduces altruism on average. Standard deviations also tend to be di¤erent, but the pattern is
not so uniform.
We now present the estimated s and their frequencies. Each of the  estimate is a nonlinear transfor-
mation of the chosen quality and the empirical quality distribution, and market and incentive-conguration
parameters. The frequency for each  estimate is the same as the quality frequency, which are in Figures
25
1 to 3, so we do not write the frequencies again. We maintain the normalization by measuring  estimates
from the means, which are in Table 3. In Table 5, we list the normalized estimated s corresponding to
each quality between 0 and 10.
Table 5: Estimated monopoly  values, normalized at mean
q = 0 q = 1 q = 2 q = 3 q = 4 q = 5 q = 6 q = 7 q = 8 q = 9 q = 10
(p = 10, c = 0:075, b = 0:5)
-1.252 -0.952 -0.652 -0.352 -0.052 0.248 0.548 0.848 1.148 1.448 1.748
(p = 10, c = 0:075, b = 1)
-0.622 -0.472 -0.322 -0.172 -0.022 0.128 0.278 0.428 0.578 0.728 0.878
(p = 10, c = 0:1, b = 0:5)
-1.515 -1.115 -0.715 -0.315 0.085 0.485 0.885 1.285 1.685 2.085 2.485
(p = 10, c = 0:1, b = 1)
-0.746 -0.546 -0.346 -0.146 0.054 0.254 0.454 0.654 0.854 1.054 1.254
(p = 15, c = 0:075, b = 0:5)
-1.446 -1.146 -0.846 -0.546 -0.246 0.054 0.354 0.654 0.954 1.254 1.554
(p = 15, c = 0:075, b = 1)
-0.725 -0.575 -0.425 -0.275 -0.125 0.025 0.175 0.325 0.475 0.625 0.775
(p = 15, c = 0:1, b = 0:5)
-1.805 -1.405 -1.005 -0.605 -0.205 0.195 0.595 0.995 1.395 1.795 2.195
(p = 15, c = 0:1, b = 1)
-0.889 -0.689 -0.489 -0.289 -0.089 0.111 0.311 0.511 0.711 0.911 1.111
The frequencies of these normalized estimated s are in the following histograms in Figure 4. In these
histograms, and later ones to be presented, we do not use identical scales on the horizontal axis. The 8
histograms exhibit various spreads. Due to the nonlinear transformation from the observed qualities to the
estimated , the actual values di¤er considerably across di¤erent incentive congurations. However, these
histograms show that altruism distributions are diverse.
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Figure 4: Histograms of estimated  in each incentive conguration in monopoly
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Next, we turn to estimated duopoly  (again normalized by the corresponding monopoly mean) in
Table 6; we do not report those  when the corresponding quality was chosen by none of the subjects. The
corresponding histograms are in Figure 5. The frequency for each  estimate is the same as the corresponding
quality frequency, which is in Figure 2.
Table 6: Estimated duopoly  values, normalized at monopoly mean
q = 0 q = 1 q = 2 q = 3 q = 4 q = 5 q = 6 q = 7 q = 8 q = 9 q = 10
(p = 10, c = 0:075, b = 0:5)
-10.486 - -5.422 -4.272 -3.430 -2.758 -2.186 -1.668 -1.177 -0.689 -0.187
(p = 10, c = 0:075, b = 1)
-8.148 - -3.359 -2.603 -2.079 -1.682 -1.359 -1.071 -0.792 -0.506 -0.187
(p = 10, c = 0:1, b = 0:5)
- -7.4 - -4.289 -3.364 -2.608 -1.942 -1.321 -0.710 -0.088 0.559
(p = 10, c = 0:1, b = 1)
-8.824 -4.912 - -2.613 -2.038 -1.607 -1.244 -0.900 -0.542 -0.141 0.332
(p = 15, c = 0:075, b = 0:5)
- - - -6.430 -5.252 -4.349 -3.613 -2.979 -2.403 -1.851 -1.296
(p = 15, c = 0:075, b = 1)
-11.376 -6.272 -4.496 -3.569 -2.923 -2.443 -2.079 -1.772 -1.489 -1.213 -0.900
(p = 15, c = 0:1, b = 0:5)
-15.714 - - -6.486 -5.255 -4.284 -3.468 -2.744 -2.071 -1.412 -0.741
(p = 15, c = 0:1, b = 1)
-11.589 - - -3.956 -3.156 -2.551 -2.082 -1.688 -1.326 -0.967 -0.568
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Figure 5: Histograms of estimated  in each incentive conguration in duopoly
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The estimated values of  are very di¤erent from those in monopoly. The range has become much
wider. From the histograms, we see that the higher values of estimated s have higher densities, but all of
these higher values are below the corresponding monopoly mean. Subjects have become much less altruistic.
Besides the stronger concentration, the  distributions appear to be strongly left-skewed in duopoly.
Table 7 presents the (normalized)  estimates for quadropoly, and Figure 6 presents the histogram. The
frequency for each  estimate is the same as the corresponding quality frequency, which is in Figure 3. Similar
to duopoly, quadropoly  distributions show a stronger concentration below the normalized monopoly mean
and are left-skewed, as in duopoly.
Table 7: Estimated quadropoly  values, normalized at monopoly mean
q = 0 q = 1 q = 2 q = 3 q = 4 q = 5 q = 6 q = 7 q = 8 q = 9 q = 10
(p = 10, c = 0:075, b = 0:5)
-11.194 - - - -3.733 -3.079 -2.540 -2.073 -1.648 -1.245 -0.845
(p = 10, c = 0:075, b = 1)
-10.619 - -3.753 -2.838 -2.258 -1.843 -1.521 -1.253 -1.015 -0.788 -0.550
(p = 10, c = 0:1, b = 0:5)
-21.505 -11.209 -7.642 - -4.539 -3.651 -2.941 -2.322 -1.730 -1.095 -0.331
(p = 10, c = 0:1, b = 1)
-10.742 - - -2.866 -2.258 -1.815 -1.460 -1.154 -0.864 -0.560 -0.197
(p = 15, c = 0:075, b = 0:5)
-16.391 - - - -5.598 -4.707 -3.992 -3.390 -2.860 -2.374 -1.908
(p = 15, c = 0:075, b = 1)
-15.717 - - -4.191 -3.362 -2.783 -2.346 -1.995 -1.698 -1.429 -1.163
(p = 15, c = 0:1, b = 0:5)
-16.729 - - -6.908 -5.671 -4.721 -3.944 -3.277 -2.678 -2.117 -1.566
(p = 15, c = 0:1, b = 1)
-15.883 -8.235 -5.619 -4.259 -3.403 -2.796 -2.329 -1.947 -1.614 -1.305 -0.987
30
Figure 6: Histograms of estimated  in each incentive conguration in quadropoly
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Estimations show striking di¤erences between monopoly  distributions and the duopoly and quadropoly
 distributions. Whereas preferences tend to exhibit diversity in monopoly, they are less diverse in duopoly,
and becoming less so in quadropoly. Densities of estimated s tend to vary quite a lot in monopoly, but a
lot less so in duopoly and quadropoly. Moreover, estimated  distributions tend to be left-skewed and being
more concentrated at the high end of the distribution.
4.4 Counterfactual monopoly qualities from estimated duopoly and quadropoly
altruism
Whereas Table 2 and Figures 1 to 3 report the outcomes, our structural estimation of  distributions
in 4.2 can separately identify the e¤ects (i) due to preferences change and (ii) due to market-incentive
changes. However, results in Subsections 4.2 and 4.3 are obtained without explicit derivations of Bayes-Nash
equilibria. One could not easily compute duopoly or quadropoly equilibrium quality distributions under the
counterfactual that preference distributions remained unchanged at the monopoly conguration.
Instead, we perform counterfactual of the following sort. We use the estimated altruism distributions
in an incentive conguration in duopoly or quadropoly to calculate the optimal qualities under monopoly.
That is, we take  values and their frequencies from Tables 6 and 7 and feed them into the monopoly rst-
order condition (4) to calculate optimal qualities. The next two gures show the counterfactual histograms
of monopoly qualities when s are those identied in duopoly and quadropoly. In each counterfactual
computation, the optimal qualities need not be integers, and we have limited the optimal qualities to be
nonnegative. (Those estimated  in duopoly and quadropoly that are negative have been replaced by 0 to
ensure a nonnegative optimal monopoly quality.)
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Figure 7: Counterfactual monopoly quality histogram from duopoly altruism 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Figure 8: Counterfactual monopoly quality histogram from quadropoly altruism 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Di¤erences between empirical monopoly qualities and counterfactual qualities are striking. Histograms
in Figures 7 and 8 have no resemblance to those in the empirical quality distributions in Figure 1. This
indeed indicates that markets and incentives do change preferences.
5 Reduced-form analysis of experimental data
We now present reduced-form analysis of subjectsquality choices. Table 2 already describes the 24 quality
means and standard deviations for the 3 markets and 8 incentive congurations, and Figures 1 to 3 show the
quality histograms. Here, we rst present some aggregated descriptive statistics, and then regression results.
A subject makes 8 quality choices in each market. Of these 8, four of them are made with one xed
incentive-conguration parameter. For example, under monopoly at p = 10, a subject chooses 4 qualities,
while cost and patient-benet parameters vary between low and high. We record the average of these 4
qualities for each subject, and then we nd the average of all 361 subjects (the average of a total of 1; 444
quality choices). In Table 8, the rst entry 3:959 records the mean of subjects average quality choices
at p = 10, and 2:900 is the corresponding standard deviation. Across that row, when the price is set at
15, the higher level, the mean becomes 4:652, and the standard deviation becomes 3:327. The relative
di¤erence, 0:175, equals (4:652   3:959)=3:959. The rest of Table 8 presents the quality-choice averages for
each parameter in each market.10
From the rst three rows with data entries in Table 8, average quality is higher in each market when the
price is set at the higher level, but the relative di¤erence declines as the market becomes more competitive.
From the second set of data entries, average quality becomes lower when cost is set at the higher level,
although the relative di¤erence remains almost the same across markets. For patient benets, quality
averages exhibit a di¤erent pattern. For monopoly, a higher patient benet results in a slightly lower
average quality, whereas for duopoly and quadropoly, a high patient benet results in slightly higher quality
averages. But in all three markets, the relative di¤erence seems very small.
10Table 8 aggregates the information in Table 2, which contains quality-choice means and standard deviations in
each incentive-conguration-market constellation.
35
Table 8: Descriptives on the variations in price, costs, and patient benet
Low parameter level High parameter level
(N=1,444, per market) (N=1,444, per market) Relative
Parameter Mean st. dev. Mean st. dev. di¤erence
Price (p = 10; p = 15)
Monopoly 3.959 2.900 4.652 3.327 0.175
Duopoly 7.442 1.573 8.595 1.625 0.155
Quadropoly 7.841 1.479 8.862 1.484 0.130
Cost (c = 0:075; c = 0:1)
Monopoly 4.493 3.227 4.118 3.038 -0.083
Duopoly 8.380 1.660 7.657 1.662 -0.086
Quadropoly 8.704 1.489 8.000 1.564 -0.081
Patient benet (b = 0:5; b = 1)
Monopoly 4.323 3.150 4.287 3.128 -0.008
Duopoly 7.925 1.668 8.112 1.726 0.024
Quadropoly 8.310 1.523 8.393 1.608 0.010
We next use ordinary least square regressions to study the e¤ect of market competition and incentive-
congurations:
qi = + 1D + 2Q+ 1Price+ 2Cost+ 3Benefit+  Xi + "i (18)
where qi, the dependent variable, is subject is quality choice, and  is the intercept. Experimental ma-
nipulations are dened by a set of dummies. Regarding monopoly as the reference market, we use the
dummy variables D and Q to represent duopoly and quadropoly, respectively; a dummy is set to 1 when
the quality on the left-hand side has been chosen under the corresponding market condition. The Price,
Cost, and Benefit variables are also dummies. The variable Price takes the value of 1 when price p is
equal to the high level of 15; it takes the value at 0 otherwise. Similarly, Cost takes the value of 1 when
c = 0:1, and Benefit takes the value of 1 when patient benet b = 1; otherwise, they are 0. Equation (18)
includes a vector of additional control Xi of market orders (see Table 1) and session dummies, and nally
"i is an error term. Model (1) in Table 9 presents the estimation results. In Model (2), we add market and
incentive-conguration interaction terms.
From Table 9, quality is signicantly higher in duopoly and quadropoly compared to monopoly, and the
magnitudes are similar in both models. Wald tests indicate a highly signicant di¤erence between Duopoly
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and Quadropoly (p < 0:001). For incentive congurations with a high price, a low cost, and a high patient
benets, qualities are signicantly higher; see Model (1). With interaction terms in Model (2), the e¤ects
of price and cost remain qualitatively similar but the magnitudes have declined. The average benet e¤ect
becomes insignicant; this suggests that the patient-benet e¤ect may be market specic. Using Wald tests,
we nd that market e¤ects are signicantly larger than market-conguration e¤ects (at p < 0:001).
Table 9: Quality regressions
Model (1) (2)
Duopoly (D) 3.713*** 3.545***
(0.158) (0.157)
Quadropoly (Q) 4.046*** 3.987***
(0.157) (0.156)
High price (= 1 if p = 15) 0.955*** 0.693***
(0.029) (0.050)
High cost (= 1 if c = 0:1) -0.601*** -0.375***
(0.024) (0.046)
High benet (= 1 if b = 1) 0.078*** -0.036
(0.024) (0.043)
Duopoly  High price 0.461***
(0.066)
Quadropoly  High price 0.328***
(0.061)
Duopoly  High cost -0.348***
(0.056)
Quadropoly  High cost -0.328***
(0.055)
Duopoly  High benet 0.224***
(0.056)
Quadropoly  High benet 0.119**
(0.055)
Market order and session dummies Yes Yes
Constant 3.971*** 4.047***
(0.400) (0.399)
Observations 8,664 8,664
Subjects 361 361
R2 0.445 0.447
Notes: OLS; robust standard errors clustered for subjects in brackets; *** for p < 0:01; ** for p < 0:05
From Models (1) and (2) results, more intense market competition has implemented higher equilibrium
37
qualities. An interpretation of an unqualied success of competition (under regulated prices) on implementing
higher qualities, however, is misguided. Bayes-Nash equilibrium qualities depend on preferences, markets,
and incentive congurations. Our structural estimation supports reduction in altruism, which generally
reduces subjectsqualities in equilibrium. The scenario is more appropriately described as a tug of war
between altruism reduction and competition-incentive disciplinary powers. In our setting, competition-
incentive powers have won over altruism reduction.
6 Concluding remarks
Using behavioral data from an experiment in a health frame, we show that the altruistic preferences are
a¤ected by markets and incentives. We model subjectspreferences through a linear utility function whose
marginal rate of substitution is interpreted as the degree of altruism. Subjects play a simultaneous-move
incomplete information game when they compete with each other. Using the experimental data, we estimate
the altruism distribution in each market-incentive environment. The estimation results show that subjects
are less altruistic when they have to compete against each other.
Although our conclusion is that altruism has changed, we have maintained certain assumptions, both
in the theoretical model and in the experiment. The structural model does require some consistency in
preferences between di¤erent markets and incentive congurations. So to speak, we can estimate changing
preferences only if those changes are not so drastic. We narrow down our study to one altruism parameter.
The assumption that individuals are interested only in prots and patient benets is maintained through-
out. We would not be in a position to test if subjects would become spiteful, winning oriented, or fair-minded
when they participate in duopoly or quadropoly. Our design does minimize these contaminations, however.
We have only told subjects very sparse outcome information. Subjects never have learned that they have
been disadvantagedby the rival, that their qualities have been higher or lower than rivals, or that their
choices turn out to be similar or very di¤erent from the population averages. We have limited subjects
ability to learn about each other by implementing a simultaneous-move game. Interaction between subjects
and learning about the population are both impossible in our design. Every attempt has been made to
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ensure that a subject is playing against another randomly drawn subject, and only once.
We make the point that economic institutions may a¤ect preferences in nontrivial ways. Economic
institutions may shape preferences just as climate, cultural-historical events, physiology, and genetics.
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Appendix A Materials for the experiment
A.1 Instructions
You are taking part in an economic decision-making experiment. Please carefully read the instructions. It
is very important that you do not speak with other participants for the duration of the experiment. If you
break these rules, you could be excluded from the experiment and not receive any payment. If you do not
understand something, please take another look at the instructions. If you still have questions, please raise
your hand. We will come to you at your cubicle and answer your questions in private.
You can earn money in the course of the experiment. The amount of your earnings depends on your
decisions and decisions made by other participants. At no time will you be told the names of the other
participants. They will also not at any time be informed about your identity.
For showing up you will receive a fee of EUR 2.50.
All monetary amounts in this experiment are expressed in Taler, whereby the following applies: Taler
100 = EUR 1.
At the end of the experiment, the amount of money you earned will be paid to you in cash. Your
decisions are made on the computer screen present in your cubicle. All data and answers will be evaluated
anonymously. You were asked to draw your own personal cubicle number in order to maintain anonymity.
The experiment will last around 60 minutes and consists of three parts. Before each of the three parts you
will receive detailed instructions and be asked to answer control questions pertaining to these instructions.
Please note: Neither your decisions in the rst part nor in the second part of the experiment have an inuence
on the other parts of the experiment.
We will ask you to answer a few questions at the end of the experiment. You will receive an additional
payment for answering this questionnaire.
First part of the Experiment. In the rst part of experiment, you will take on the role of a physician
and make decisions about the treatment of various patients. In total, you will determine the quality of care
that you would like provide for eight di¤erent types of patients. For each of these patients you can choose
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quality of 0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9 or 10.
The demand for medical care by the various patient types is determined only after you have made your
decisions about the quality of care for all eight types.
[Duopoly: You are randomly matched with another participant. This participant also decides in the
role of a physician. Also this physician determines the quality for the same eight types of patients. The
matching with this participants remains throughout the entire second part of the experiment. You and the
other physician chose the quality simultaneously and independently from each other.]
[Quadropoly: You are randomly matched with three other participants. These participants also decide in
the role of a physicians. Also these physicians determine the quality for the same eight types of patients.
The matching with these participants remains throughout the entire third part of the experiment. You and
the other physicians chose the quality simultaneously and independently from each other.]
In total, 100 patients of each type demand medical care. It will only be determined after you have made
your decisions about the quality of care for all eight types how many of the 100 patients of each type wish
to seek treatment from you.
[Duopoly: Only after you and the other physician, you are matched with, decided upon the quality of
medical treatment for the eight patients, it is determined how many of the 100 patients seek treatment from
you and the other physician.]
[Quadrupoly: Only after you and the others physicians, you are matched with, decided upon the quality of
medical treatment for the eight patients, it is determined how many of the 100 patients seek treatment from
you and the other physicians.]
Earnings. For each patient who seeks medical care from you, you receive a lump sum that is independent
of the quality of care you have selected. You incur costs with your selection of the quality of care. These
costs depend on the quality level you choose and can vary between the di¤erent patient types. Your earnings
for each patient type are as follows:
Earnings = (Lumpsum-Costs)Number of patients who seek medical care from you
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(when read: your earnings are equal to the di¤erence between the lump sum and the costs that arise from
the quality of care you have chosen, multiplied by the number of patients who seek treatment from you.)
With the quality of care you choose, you determine not only your own earnings, but also the utility
enjoyed by the patient. The amount of the lump sum, your costs, your earnings, and the patients utility
will be displayed on your screen (as illustrated in Subsection A.3) for each patient type.
Before you choose the quality of care for each patient type, you have the opportunity to click on the
calculatorbutton and thereby calculate patientspotential demand for treatment (as illustrated in Sub-
section A.3). You can enter the quality you would like to provide as many times as you want. Clicking on
the calculate button provides you with information about the number of patients who would seek care
given the quality level you entered. In addition, you receive information about the resulting earnings and
patient utility. You dene the quality of care that you wish to provide by entering that quality in the eld
your decisionand conrming this entry with OK.
Payment. After the conclusion of the experiment, one of the 8 decisions will be randomly chosen to
function as the relevant round for determining your payment for this part of the experiment. The earnings
from this randomly-chosen round will be converted into Euro at the end of the experiment and paid out to
you in cash. There are no participants present in the lab who take on the role of patients. An actual patient
will benet from the patient utility resulting from the quality of care you selected in the randomly-chosen
round: A monetary value equaling the patient utility derived from your decision, multiplied by the number
of patients who seek treatment from you, will be transferred to Christo¤el Blindenmission Deutschland e.V.,
64625 Bensheim. This organization will use the funds to enable the treatment of patients su¤ering from
cataracts, a serious eye condition.
Control questions. Before proceeding to the decisions in the experiment, we would like to ask you to
answer several control questions. These control questions should make it easier for you become acquainted
with the decision-making situation. If you have questions about this, please raise your hand. The rst part
of the experiment will begin after all participants have correctly answered the control questions.
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Payment Procedure. In order to ensure that payments to the participants and the transfer of the
monetary donation to Christo¤el Blindenmission Deutschland e.V. are carried out correctly, an overseer will
be randomly chosen after the third part of the experiment. The overseer receives a fee of Euro 5 in addition
to his or her regular payment from the experiment. The overseer will a¢ rm that the transfer to Christo¤el
Blindenmission is correctly carried out by the nancial administration of the University of Cologne. For the
transfer to Christo¤el Blindenmission, the overseer will ll out a payment order to Christo¤el Blindenmission
with the amount, in Euro, that corresponds to the patient utility realized in the randomly-selected round.
The nancial administration of the University of Cologne will then execute payment of the donation to
Christo¤el Blindenmission using funds allocated for this experiment. The form will be placed in a stamped
envelope addressed to the nancial administration of the University of Cologne. The overseer and the
experimenter will jointly deposit this envelope in the nearest mailbox.
The overseer will conrm by signing a form that he or she properly carried out the assigned tasks, as
described above. A copy of this form, as well as a copy of the conrmation from Christo¤el Blindenmission
that the donation was received, can be requested by all participants from the o¢ ce of the Seminar of Personnel
Economics and Human Resource Management. The copies will be sent by e-mail.
A.2 Control questions of the experiment
Comprehension questions
[The comprehension questions are presented for the market order Monopoly-Duopoly-Quadropoly. Ques-
tion that are the same irrespective of the market setting are marked with an asterisk (*).]
Monopoly
1. In the rst part of the experiment, you decide in the role of a about the treatment of
.(*)
2. For how many di¤erent patient types, do you decide on quality of treatment
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3. How many patients of each type demand medical services in total?
4. How many physicians decide on the quality of medical services beside you in a market?
5. Is the following statement true or false? Your quality choice for a patient does not only determine
your prot but also the patients benet. (*)
  True
  False
To answer the following two questions, please consider the examples on your computer screen.
6. Please consider Example A on your computer screen. Please assume that you would choose a quality
of 1 for patients of this type. For one patient, what is
a. your capitation?
b. your costs?
c. your prot?
d. the patients benet?
7. Again, please consider Example A on your computer screen. Please assume, that you would choose
a quality of 4 for the patients of this type (Hint: To answer the questions below, please use the
calculator on your computer screen.).
a. What is the patient demand for your treatment quality?
b. What is your prot?
c. What is the patients benet?
8. Now, please consider Example B on your computer screen. Please assume, that you would choose a
quality of 7 for patients of this type. For one patient, what is
a. your capitation?
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b. your costs?
c. your prot?
d. the patients benet?
9. Again, please consider Example B on your computer screen. Please assume, that you would choose
a quality of 5 for the patients of this type (Hint: To answer the questions below, please use the
calculator on your computer screen.).
a. What is the patient demand for your treatment quality?
b. What is your prot?
c. What is the patients benet?
10. Which of the following statements is true? (*)
  Your quality choice for a patient type determines the number of patients of this type who demand
your treatment quality. For those patients, who demand your treatment, the quality choice
determines the patient benet. In addition, your quality choice determines your prot for the
patient type.
  Your quality choice for a patient type determines the number of patients of that type who demand
your treatment quality. While your quality choice has no inuence on the patient benet it
determines your prot.
  Your quality choice for a patient type does not determine the number of patients of that type who
demand your treatment quality. Your quality choice has no inuence on the patient benet and
only determines your prot.
  None.
11. Please complete the following sentence!
After the completion of the experiment, it will be determined , which of your decisions
from this part of the experiment is relevant for determining your payment and the patients benet. (*)
49
Duopoly
1. For how many di¤erent patient types, do you decide on quality of treatment
2. How many patients of each type demand medical services in total?
3. How many physicians decide on the quality of medical services beside you in a market?
To answer the following two questions, please consider the examples on your computer screen.
4. Please consider Example A on your computer screen. Please assume that you would choose a quality
of 1 for patients of this type. For one patient, what is
a. your capitation?
b. your costs?
c. your prot?
d. the patients benet?
5. Again, please consider Example A on your computer screen. Please assume, that you would choose
a quality of 4 for the patients of this type. The other physician would choose a quality of 3 (Hint:
To answer the questions below, please use the calculator on your computer screen.).
a. What is the patient demand for your treatment quality?
b. What is the patient demand for the other physicians treatment quality?
c. What is your prot?
d. What is the other physicians prot?
e. What is the patients benet resulting from your quality decision?
e. What is the patients benet resulting from the other physicians quality decision?
6. Now, please consider Example B on your computer screen. Please assume, that you would choose a
quality of 7 for patients of this type. For one patient, what is
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a. your capitation?
b. your costs?
c. your prot?
d. the patients benet?
7. Again, please consider Example B on your computer screen. Please assume, that you would choose
a quality of 5 for the patients of this type. The other physician would choose a quality of 6 (Hint:
To answer the questions below, please use the calculator on your computer screen.).
a. What is the patient demand for your treatment quality?
b. What is the patient demand for the other physicians treatment quality?
c. What is your prot?
d. What is the other physicians prot?
e. What is the patients benet resulting from your quality decision?
e. What is the patients benet resulting from the other physicians quality decision?
Quadropoly
1. For how many di¤erent patient types, do you decide on quality of treatment
2. How many patients of each type demand medical services in total?
3. How many physicians decide on the quality of medical services beside you in a market?
To answer the following two questions, please consider the examples on your computer screen.
4. Please consider Example A on your computer screen. Please assume that you would choose a quality
of 1 for patients of this type. For one patient, what is
a. your capitation?
b. your costs?
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c. your prot?
d. the patients benet?
5. Again, please consider Example A on your computer screen. Please assume, that you would choose
a quality of 4 for the patients of this type. The other physicians would choose a quality of 3 (Hint:
To answer the questions below, please use the calculator on your computer screen.).
a. What is the patient demand for your treatment quality?
b. What is the patient demand for the second physicians treatment quality?
c. What is the patient demand for the third physicians treatment quality?
d. What is the patient demand for the fourth physicians treatment quality?
e. What is your prot?
f. What is the second physicians prot?
g. What is the third physicians prot?
h. What is the fourth physicians prot?
i. What is the patients benet resulting from your quality decision?
j. What is the patients benet resulting from the second physicians quality decision?
k. What is the patients benet resulting from the third physicians quality decision?
l. What is the patients benet resulting from the fourth physicians quality decision?
6. Now, please consider Example B on your computer screen. Please assume, that you would choose a
quality of 7 for patients of this type. For one patient, what is
a. your capitation?
b. your costs?
c. your prot?
d. the patients benet?
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7. Again, please consider Example B on your computer screen. Please assume, that you would choose a
quality of 5 for the patients of this type. The second and the third physician would choose a quality
of 6. The fourth physician would choose a quality of 4. (Hint: To answer the questions below, please
use the calculator on your computer screen.).
a. What is the patient demand for your treatment quality?
b. What is the patient demand for the second physicians treatment quality?
c. What is the patient demand for the third physicians treatment quality?
d. What is the patient demand for the fourth physicians treatment quality?
e. What is your prot?
f. What is the second physicians prot?
g. What is the third physicians prot?
h. What is the fourth physicians prot?
i. What is the patients benet resulting from your quality decision?
j. What is the patients benet resulting from the second physicians quality decision?
k. What is the patients benet resulting from the third physicians quality decision?
l. What is the patients benet resulting from the fourth physicians quality decision?
53
A.3 Screen shots and experiment parameters
Figure 9: Decision screen shot
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Figure 10: Duopoly calculator screenshot
Figure 11: Duopoly calculator screenshot with qualities inputted
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Figure 12: Quadropoly calculator screenshot
56
Appendix B Robustness: alternate utility function, and between-
subject subsample
B.1 Constant absolute risk aversion utility
Instead of the linear utility function, we now assume that utility takes the form U(x) = 1   exp( 0:1x),
where the coe¢ cient of absolute risk aversion is set at 0:1. Table 11 reports the means of estimated s
The relative magnitudes between these means are quite close to those for the linear utility function in
Table 3. For example, the mean  in incentive conguration (p = 10, c = 0:075, b = 0:5) is two times of that
in conguration (p = 10, c = 0:075, b = 1). The same is true for the linear utility model; see the rst two
rows in Table 3. Using the same normalization (subtracting the monopoly mean), we report the means and
standard deviations of estimated s in Duopoly and Quadropoly in Table 12.
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Table 10: Experiment parameters
Quality, q
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Incentive conguration 1 (p = 10, c = 0:1, b = 1)
Capitation, p 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10
Cost, c(q) 0 0.1 0.4 0.9 1.6 2.5 3.6 4.9 6.4 8.1 10
Prot, p  c(q) 10 9.9 9.6 9.1 8.4 7.5 6.4 5.1 3.6 1.9 0
Patient benet, q 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Incentive conguration 2 (p = 10, c = 0:075, b = 1)
Capitation, p 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10
Cost, c(q) 0 0.075 0.3 0.675 1.2 1.875 2.7 3.675 4.8 6.075 7.5
Prot, p  c(q) 10 9.925 9.7 9.325 8.8 8.125 7.3 6.325 5.2 3.925 2.5
Patient benet, q 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Incentive conguration 3 (p = 15, c = 0:1, b = 0:5)
Capitation, p 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15
Cost, c(q) 0 0.1 0.4 0.9 1.6 2.5 3.6 4.9 6.4 8.1 10
Prot, p  c(q) 15 14.9 14.6 14.1 13.4 12.5 11.4 10.1 8.6 6.9 5
Patient benet, q 0 0.5 1 1.5 2 2.5 3 3.5 4 4.5 5
Incentive conguration 4 (p = 15, c = 0:1, b = 1)
Capitation, p 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15
Cost, c(q) 0 0.1 0.4 0.9 1.6 2.5 3.6 4.9 6.4 8.1 10
Prot, p  c(q) 15 14.9 14.6 14.1 13.4 12.5 11.4 10.1 8.6 6.9 5
Patient benet, q 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Incentive conguration 5 (p = 10, c = 0:1, b = 0:5)
Capitation, p 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10
Cost, c(q) 0 0.1 0.4 0.9 1.6 2.5 3.6 4.9 6.4 8.1 10
Prot, p  c(q) 10 9.9 9.6 9.1 8.4 7.5 6.4 5.1 3.6 1.9 0
Patient benet, q 0 0.5 1 1.5 2 2.5 3 3.5 4 4.5 5
Incentive conguration 6 (p = 10, c = 0:075, b = 0:5)
Capitation, p 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10
Cost, c(q) 0 0.075 0.3 0.675 1.2 1.875 2.7 3.675 4.8 6.075 7.5
Prot, p  c(q) 10 9.925 9.7 9.325 8.8 8.125 7.3 6.325 5.2 3.925 2.5
Patient benet, q 0 0.5 1 1.5 2 2.5 3 3.5 4 4.5 5
Incentive conguration 7 (p = 15, c = 0:075, b = 1)
Capitation, p 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15
Cost, c(q) 0 0.075 0.3 0.675 1.2 1.875 2.7 3.675 4.8 6.075 7.5
Prot, p  c(q) 15 14.925 14.7 14.325 13.8 13.125 12.3 11.325 10.2 8.925 7.5
Patient benet, q 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Incentive conguration 8 (p = 15, c = 0:075, b = 0:5)
Capitation, p 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15
Cost, c(q) 0 0.075 0.3 0.675 1.2 1.875 2.7 3.675 4.8 6.075 7.5
Prot, p  c(q) 15 14.925 14.7 14.325 13.8 13.125 12.3 11.325 10.2 8.925 7.5
Patient benet, q 0 0.5 1 1.5 2 2.5 3 3.5 4 4.5 5
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Table 11: Estimated means of  in monopoly under CARA
Incentive congurations mean
(p = 10, c = 0:075, b = 0:5) 0.066
(p = 10, c = 0:075, b = 1) 0.033
(p = 10, c = 0:1, b = 0:5) 0.084
(p = 10, c = 0:1, b = 1) 0.041
(p = 15, c = 0:075, b = 0:5) 0.051
(p = 15, c = 0:075, b = 1) 0.026
(p = 15, c = 0:1, b = 0:5) 0.071
(p = 15, c = 0:1, b = 1) 0.034
Table 12: Normalized means and standard deviations of  distributions under CARA
Incentive congurations Monopoly Duopoly Quadropoly
mean st. dev. mean st. dev. mean st. dev.
(p = 10, c = 0:075, b = 0:5) 0 0.059 -0.083 0.067 -0.098 0.054
(p = 10, c = 0:075, b = 1) 0 0.030 -0.050 0.042 -0.062 0.043
(p = 10, c = 0:1, b = 0:5) 0 0.082 -0.086 0.073 -0.143 0.112
(p = 10, c = 0:1, b = 1) 0 0.040 -0.054 0.052 -0.068 0.054
(p = 15, c = 0:075, b = 0:5) 0 0.045 -0.105 0.050 -0.126 0.051
(p = 15, c = 0:075, b = 1) 0 0.023 -0.065 0.040 -0.078 0.058
(p = 15, c = 0:1, b = 0:5) 0 0.069 -0.104 0.078 -0.127 0.065
(p = 15, c = 0:1, b = 1) 0 0.033 -0.062 0.046 -0.078 0.053
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Again, the means have all become lower when the market becomes more competitive. The di¤erences
between the normalized duopoly and quadropoly means also point in the same direction as those in the
linear utility model although the magnitudes have now become smaller (see Table 4).
For brevity, we do not present the estimated  values. Figures 13, 14 and 15 are the histograms of
estimated normalized altruism distributions for the three markets. The comparisons between these with
those under linear utility (histograms in Figures 4, 5, and 6) just show the di¤erences in estimated values.
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Figure 13: Histograms of estimated  for CARA in each incentive conguration in monopoly
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Figure 14: Histograms of estimated  for CARA in each incentive conguration in duopoly
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Figure 15: Histograms of estimated  for CARA in each incentive conguration in quadropoly
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B.2 Between-subject subsample
We use subjectsrst experiences for a between-subject experiment. From Table 1, roughly a third of the
361 subjects played each of the three markets in their rst round, so we only can use about 1=3 of the entire
data. In the experiments, 124 subjects played the monopoly game rst, 119 played the duopoly rst, and
118 played the quadropoly rst. The 8 decisions of these rst games constitute the subsample.
Table 13 presents the rst-round summary statistics of the 8 incentive-conguration games in the 3
markets. There are some small di¤erences in the means and standard deviations between the smaller,
between-subject subsample and the full sample. Nevertheless, the means and standard deviations follow the
same pattern in Table 2. Figures 16 to 18 present the quality choice distributions by incentive congurations
for the three markets.
Table 13: Between-subject subsample summary statistics
Incentive congurations Monopoly (n = 124) Duopoly (n = 119) Quadropoly (n = 118)
mean st. dev. mean st. dev. mean st. dev.
(p = 10, c = 0:075, b = 0:5) 4.403 2.659 7.437 1.701 7.958 1.577
(p = 10, c = 0:075, b = 1) 4.460 2.688 7.765 1.598 8.017 1.764
(p = 10, c = 0:1, b = 0:5) 4.065 2.569 6.597 1.463 6.932 1.688
(p = 10, c = 0:1, b = 1) 3.871 2.521 6.622 1.408 6.958 1.538
(p = 15, c = 0:075, b = 0:5) 5.113 3.007 8.420 1.670 8.780 1.675
(p = 15, c = 0:075, b = 1) 5.266 3.021 8.672 1.698 8.898 1.892
(p = 15, c = 0:1, b = 0:5) 4.823 2.891 7.664 1.801 8.102 1.692
(p = 15, c = 0:1, b = 1) 4.734 2.930 8.000 1.616 8.254 1.949
Table 14 presents the means of estimated s in Monopoly, and they are similar to those in the full sample
in Table 3.
Table 14: Estimated means of  in monopoly
Incentive congurations mean
(p = 10, c = 0:075, b = 0:5) 1.321
(p = 10, c = 0:075, b = 1) 0.669
(p = 10, c = 0:1, b = 0:5) 1.626
(p = 10, c = 0:1, b = 1) 0.774
(p = 15, c = 0:075, b = 0:5) 1.534
(p = 15, c = 0:075, b = 1) 0.790
(p = 15, c = 0:1, b = 0:5) 1.929
(p = 15, c = 0:1, b = 1) 0.947
In Table 15, we present the means and standard deviations of estimated s in Duopoly and Quadropoly
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(under the same normalization as before). There are some di¤erences from Table 4. In particular, the means
tend to be higher in magnitude than those in the full sample. The standard deviations are also bigger, but
that can be accounted for by the smaller sample size.
Table 15: Normalized means and standard deviations of  distributions
Incentive congurations Monopoly Duopoly Quadropoly
mean st. dev. mean st. dev. mean st. dev.
(p = 10, c = 0:075, b = 0:5) 0 0.798 -1.532 1.170 -1.789 1.076
(p = 10, c = 0:075, b = 1) 0 0.403 -0.893 0.531 -1.141 1.005
(p = 10, c = 0:1, b = 0:5) 0 1.027 -1.639 1.053 -2.762 2.782
(p = 10, c = 0:1, b = 1) 0 0.504 -1.011 0.588 -1.315 1.322
(p = 15, c = 0:075, b = 0:5) 0 0.902 -2.188 1.045 -2.665 1.511
(p = 15, c = 0:075, b = 1) 0 0.453 -1.345 0.733 -1.743 1.903
(p = 15, c = 0:1, b = 0:5) 0 1.156 -2.377 1.708 -2.832 1.641
(p = 15, c = 0:1, b = 1) 0 0.586 -1.323 0.706 -1.743 1.585
We next present the histograms of the actual qualities in the subsample in Figures 16, 17, and 18, with
the frequencies written on top of each quality level. Qualities in monopoly in the full and between-subject
subsample show more variations. However, the duopoly and quadropoly quality distributions are remarkably
similar.
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Figure 16: Between-subject quality histograms in monopoly
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Figure 17: Between-subject quality histograms in duopoly
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Figure 18: Between-subject quality histograms in quadropoly
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Figures 19, 20, and 21 plot the histograms of estimated  distributions. (Again for brevity, we have omit-
ted the actual estimated values.) As with the case of qualities, the estimated  distributions in monopoly
show more di¤erences between the full sample and the between-subject sample, but the estimated  distrib-
utions in duopoly and quadropoly are remarkably similar. Overall, we think that our results are robust with
respect to between-subject and within-subject designs.
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Figure 19: Between-subject histograms of estimated monopoly 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Figure 20: Between-subject histograms of estimated duopoly 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Figure 21: Between-subject histograms of estimated quadropoly 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B.2.1 Reduced-form analysis for between-subject subsample
Table 16 reports descriptive statistics on subjectsrst-experience average qualities for low and high para-
meter levels of price, cost, and patient benets. The entries are written with the same convention as in Table
8. The average qualities in Table 16 exhibit the same pattern as those in Table 8. The average quality is
higher in each market at the higher price, but the relative di¤erence declines as the market becomes more
competitive. Average qualities are lower at higher cost, but the relative di¤erence hardly varies with com-
petition. Patient benet does not seem to a¤ect average qualities much. We conclude that the reduced-form
analysis is robust with respect to the between-subject and within-subject designs.
Table 16: Descriptives on the variations in price, costs, and patient benet in the subjectsrst market
session
Low parameter level High parameter level Relative N
Parameter Mean st. dev. Mean st. dev. di¤erence
Price (p = 10; p = 15)
Monopoly 4.200 2.614 4.984 2.962 0.187 496
Duopoly 7.105 1.736 8.189 1.623 0.153 476
Quadropoly 7.466 1.720 8.509 1.832 0.140 472
Cost (c = 0:075; c = 0:1)
Monopoly 4.811 2.866 4.373 2.757 -0.091 496
Duopoly 8.074 1.734 7.221 1.693 -0.106 476
Quadropoly 8.413 1.778 7.561 1.826 -0.101 472
Patient benet (b = 0:5; bH = 1)
Monopoly 4.601 2.807 4.583 2.834 -0.004 496
Duopoly 7.529 1.781 7.765 1.743 0.031 476
Quadropoly 7.943 1.781 8.032 1.919 0.011 472
Regression results for the between-subject analysis are reported in Table 17. The notation here is the
same as in Table 9, except of course that there are no market-order dummies. Because of the smaller sample,
the R2s are uniformly smaller than regressions in Table 9. Most estimates happen to be a little smaller in
their magnitudes than in Table 9, but their signicance remains the same.
73
Table 17: Between-subject quality regressions
Model: (1) (2)
Dependent variable: Quality Quality
Duopoly 3.194*** 3.125***
(0.373) (0.371)
Quadropoly 3.809*** 3.834***
(0.391) (0.387)
High price (= 1 if p = 15) 0.967*** 0.784***
(0.0459) (0.0761)
High cost (= 1 if c = 0:1) -0.710*** -0.437***
(0.0437) (0.0811)
High benet (= 1 if b = 1) 0.100** -0.0181
(0.0423) (0.0660)
Duopoly  High price 0.300***
(0.107)
Quadropoly  High price 0.258**
(0.114)
Duopoly  High cost -0.415***
(0.111)
Quadropoly  High cost -0.414***
(0.102)
Duopoly  High benet 0.253**
(0.101)
Quadropoly  High benet 0.107
(0.101)
Session dummies Yes Yes
Constant 4.051*** 4.066***
(0.334) (0.331)
Observations 2,888 2,888
Subjects 361 361
R2 0.386 0.388
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